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Abstract 
European Integration was constructed as a political project relying for its realizations primari-
ly on economic processes. Economic and Monetary Union as accomplished by the Maastricht 
Treaty were expected to consummate this endeavour. However, the whole edifice started to 
erode immediately after its establishment. Following financial and sovereign debt crises, 
EMU with its commitments to price stability and monetary politics is perceived as a failed 
construction precisely because of its reliance on inflexible rules. European crisis management 
seeks to compensate for these failures establishing regulatory machinery which disempowers 
national institutions and burdens in particular Southern Europe with austerity measures; it 
establishes pan-European commitments to budgetary discipline and macroeconomic balanc-
ing. At present the Union is in state of emergency. The prospects for the return in a constitu-
tional condition are anything but clear. 
 
I.  Introduction: The European Dilemma 
"Ich möchte Deutschland und den Deutschen für Ihren großen Einsatz für unser Europa von 
Herzen danken [I would like to thank Germany and the Germans sincerely for your great ded-
ication for our Europe]. Along [sic] the European integration history, Germany has been the 
biggest contributor in financial terms towards our project. That is why I never miss an oppor-
tunity to say thank you. Yet, let’s be completely frank, there is a paradox. The perception of 
the outside world is not always in tune with this… In politics, the issue is sometimes not what 
we do but how we do it. It is about explaining and communicating what we truly believe to be 
in the best interest of our citizens.”1 Commission President Barroso closed his remarks on 
“The State of Europe” with these words in front of a very large invitation-only audience on 9 
November 2011 at the Haus der Berliner Festspiele. Indeed: there is no sign of enthusiasm in 
Germany. But this is not what vexes the European public. On the contrary, the perception is, 
and with quite a bit of resentment, that Berlin decides what is to be done in crisis affected 
countries. The paradox of which Barroso speaks does not exist. Instead, this is a clearly delin-
eated dilemma: the enforcement of European prerogatives driven by allegedly irresistible eco-
nomic constraintsversus the rights to political autonomy on the part of states and of their citi-
zens’ trust in constitutional commitments to the rule of law (Rechtsstaatlichkeit) and democ-
racy as enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. Nobody can desire and design 
such a disastrous situation. But what has occurred cannot either be redone or controlled easily.  
 
II. Integration through law 
 
Europe is essentially a “Community of law”. This characterization which is ascribed to the 
first President of the Commission, has become an uncontested and unquestionable hallmark of 
the European project.2 From the outset, much was entrusted to law, and the law was consid-
ered capable of governing a broad range of issues. It was to overcome the natural state of the 
European world of states, replace its bellicose past with a peacetime order, and rein in the 
economic egoism of the Member States. “Integration through law” became the motto of Eu-
ropean policy in the highly influential conceptualization of its formative phase, which was 
dominated by jurists. The so-called constitutionalisation of the treaties, which created an au-
tonomous order distinctly separate both from the law of the nation-states and from interna-
tional law, emerged through the European Court of Justice and consisted of legal principles: 
Community law binds the Member States; core components not requiring implementation 
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apply directly as the “law of the land”; therefore, their effect must take precedence over na-
tional law; they must bring about unity and be applied uniformly; that is why a central author-
ity is necessary to define this unity; the European Court of Justice itself is the only suitable 
option for this function.3 Of course, on the path from the Economic Community of 1957 to the 
“ever closer union of the peoples of Europe”, Europe unceasingly remade what Hans Peter 
Ipsen has characterized as a “Wandelverfassung” and it engaged continuously in constitution-
al reconfigurations.4 Yet those dogmatic core concepts on which Europe was founded in legal 
terms remained in force. Their stability and impact seem simply phenomenal. But this appear-
ance is also deceptive. The shadow of orthodoxy in terms of European legal policy concealed 
both their inherent partiality and their political powerlessness. 
III. Processes of erosion and their causes: a digression into Karl Polanyi’s economic 
sociology  
In his remarks on “The State of Europe”, Barroso focused solely on the crisis of Economic 
and Monetary Union and thus on an institutional accomplishment, which was for a good while 
widely perceived as the consummation of very high ambitions – seemingly fully in line with 
the original project of “integration through law” as conceptualized famously by J.H.H. 
Weiler.5 There was one crucial difference, however, between Weiler’s understanding of the 
functions of law in the integration project and the later construction of monetary union. The 
special feature of the European system, as Weiler had conceptualized it, was the simultaneity 
and the balance of supranational law and inter-governmental policy.6 The law had not re-
placed political processes entirely; the equilibrium in the Community system remained de-
pendent on continuous balancing efforts. The monetary union agreed upon in the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1992 was meant to overcome that dependency. It was a political project, but one 
that was constituted and sustained by law as a legal project, a more stringent version and vi-
sion of “integration through law” as advocated by German Ordoliberalism.7: The new com-
mon currency was not to be entrusted to a political union, but to be bound to legal rules. Only 
an economic policy “that could be bound by constitutional law aligned with actionable crite-
ria” was to be practiced in Europe – that was the creed of German Ordoliberalism8 The legal 
constitution of monetary policy fulfilled this demand. It took on a form that was to immunize 
Europe against Keynesian impulses and macroeconomic policies, which required a continuous 
assessment of economic and social parameters, an in the last instance political determinations 
of priorities and which could therefore could not be legally programmed according to actiona-
ble criteria which the judiciary would supervise. As is widely recognized today, this strategy 
was anything but successful. Yet the inherent defects and design flaws of the monetary union 
and the 1997 Stability Pact rounding it out were already identified at the time by highly re-
spected economists.9 It was not long before they became generally visible. The fact that it was 
precisely Germany and France that did not follow the rules laid down in the Stability Pact and 
that the deficit procedures initiated by the Commission then came to nothing led to the Ger-
man apologists of the € incriminating themselves and calling for its legal framework to be 
perfected. These complaints continue to assume that the socioeconomically ever more diverse 
Union would be an optimal currency area and disregard the objections against the “one mar-
ket, one money” philosophy. “The 3% cap is at best ridiculous and at worst perverse”, wrote 
Barry Eichengreen, one of the most renowned observers of European monetary policy, in the 
20 November 2003 issue of DIE ZEIT. He knew that at the time, Germany under the burden 
of its unification could not afford the Stability Pact and would therefore not comply with it. 
The project of “integration through law”, expanded to include the monetary constitution, had 
gained a Pyrrhic victory in the Maastricht Treaty and a decade later met defeat at Cannae.  
The warning voices cited so far all came from mainstream economists. It is not so surpris-
ing that they can be complemented by left-leaning political economists from both within and 
outside the EU.10 By now, their analyses are much more widely noted.11 In step with these 
developments, the economic sociology of Austro-Hungarian emigré Karl Polanyi has experi-
enced a renaissance in recent years.12. We refer to his work in our remarks on the failures of 
the European project for three interrelated reasons: (1) Polanyi has underlined that modern 
markets were not generated by some evolutionary process but established by political plan-
ning13 – Europe’s “internal market project” is the best conceivable confirmation of his thesis. 
(2) One of most important insights of his work concerns the “social embeddedness” of mar-
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kets and the economy.14 These insights are of crucial importance for Europe has on the one 
hand realized that the functioning of markets requires comprehensive regulatory activities but 
tends to disregard the economic, political and cultural variety and dependence of markets. (3) 
Polanyi has also much teach us with regard tothe growing skepticism about so many so long 
firmly held beliefs about the benefits of ever more European integration. These beliefs con-
trast strikingly with what Polanyi taught us about the three “fictitious commodities”: money, 
labor, and land. According to Polanyi, they are fictitious if and because they are treated like 
goods even though they were not produced for the market. Success does not come easily to 
such imposed commodification; instead, such political moves will spark crises and provoke 
countermovements. These theorems are astonishingly current. We have already started to dis-
cuss “money” and will focus on that commodity. But it is worth noting that Polanyi’s warn-
ings deserve to be taken seriously more comprehensively. With regard to “labor”, this is obvi-
ous and particularly urgent. Headed by its highest court, Europe is waving the flag of econom-
ic freedoms of Europe’s market citizens and retreats from collective labor law – once the 
institutionalized countermovement to the commodification of labor.15 It is quite remarkable 
that this move occurred in an unheard of vigor in December 2007, that is together with the 
beginning of the financial crisis.16 After its turn towards a community of austerity, Europe is 
now riding roughshod over considerations of labor and social law. Environmental policy is 
about “land” in the sense of our natural resources – actually a flagship in the process of inte-
gration. Admittedly, one very sensitive environmental issue, namely the conflict about nuclear 
energy, does not fit this pattern – and again, the law plays an unfortunate role. Although the 
Euratom Treaty of 1957 praised atomic energy as the technology of the future par excellence, 
the decision about using it was left to the Member States. The Treaty of Lisbon did not 
change this in any way – with the consequence that a phase-out of atomic energy in Europe 
effective for everybody involved can take place only if all Member States were to implement 
it. Germany has yet to feel the effects of the de facto irreversibility of this legal situation. For 
the time being, however, Europe is preoccupied with its currency and the financial crisis. 
IV. De-juridification of monetary union and Europe’s the new modes of economic 
governance 
The debate on the European crisis oscillates between optimism (“so far every crisis has 
strengthened the integration project”), pessimism (“Europeans are neither willing nor able t 
face the challenges”) and catastrophism (“if the euro fails, then Europe fails”). The German 
Council of Economic Experts, which still exists even after the de facto repeal of the Keynes-
ian 1967 Stability Act, diagnosed “multiple crises” in its special report of 5 July 2012.17 Ac-
cording to the report, the “banking, debt and macroeconomic crises” are interrelated in a “mu-
tually reinforcing” and “vicious” circle. It is safe to characterize the present situation by a 
replacement of the notion of risks, which can be evaluated and managed, into one of high un-
certainties. What we can nevertheless observe, analyze and evaluate is the establishment of 
new modes of governance.  Since the spring of 2010, Europe has been taking action rapidly, 
and by now at breakneck speed, introducing audacious regulatory mechanisms: the “Europe 
2020 Strategy” (March 2010), the “European Semester” (May 2010), the “EFSF Framework 
Agreement” (June 2010), the “Euro Plus Pact” (March 2011), and the “Six Pack” (December 
2011). And much more is ready to complement these steps or in the pipeline: the “Two Pack” 
(November 2011), the “European Stability Mechanism” (February 2012), the “Treaty on Sta-
bility, Coordination and Governance” (TSCG, March 2012), and the banking union (Septem-
ber 2012). Since all this is difficult to reconcile with the Treaties, in particular with the bailout 
ban of Article 125 TFEU, an audacious ex post revision procedure amending Article 136 
TFEU so as to legalize financial assistance as of 1 January 2013.18  
From a legal point of view, there is quite a lot here which can and needs to be discussed, 
and not surprisingly, the debates on the extent to which the legal scope can, preferably with-
out Treaty amendments, be widened are highly intense. The deeper threat, however, does not 
stem from this or that acrobatic feat of interpretation, but from the fact that legally structured 
action is replaced by bundles of measures that are characterized by a given situation and take 
effect in particular concerning “multilateral surveillance”. A transnational functional bureau-
cracy is being established here whose forms of action are oriented towards the models of in-
dependent agencies in which there are no genuinely European competencies. To be sure, all 
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constitutional democracies are familiar with the delegation of decision-making powers to in-
stitutions that possess particular expert knowledge, develop long-term orientations, and are to 
be protected from the rhythms and vicissitudes of politics. But such delegations are usually 
limited to well-defined fields and are monitored through control mechanisms of their own. 
Giandomenico Majone, the staunchest proponent of European governance through independ-
ent agencies, has always argued for reserving all distributive policies for the nation-states be-
cause only they can be democratically legitimated to a sufficient degree. This is not possible, 
he claims, with the type of macroeconomic management now practiced in European crisis 
management, and which is to be perpetuated institutionally. This would establish European 
distribution machinery that could only change the European democratic deficit into “demo-
cratic default”.19  
V. What is left of European Constitutionalism after the financial crisis? 
We are not going into the new legal discipline of “crisis law” in any detail here, but focus in 
our discussion on the reactions of the judiciary, first those of Germany’s Federal Constitu-
tional Court (FCC), then that in the recent judgment of the ECJ, now Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), in the case of Thomas Pringle.20  
Just 20 years ago, in its judgment on the Maastricht Treaty21 the FCC has established the 
right of German citizens to ask for judicial examination of the compatibility of legislative acts 
promoting European integration with Germany’s Basic Law on the grounds that the right to 
vote guaranteed by Article 38 of the Constitution is to ensure their “participation in the demo-
cratic process.” The question submitted to the Court was whether that right to democratic 
governance excluded the transfer of the functions and powers of the Bundesbank to the Euro-
pean Central Bank. The answer of the FCC: The political rights of German citizens are not 
affected as long as the EU Treaty ensures a de-politicized essentially legal architecture of the 
monetary union. This was a statement which made sense only on the basis of Germany’s or-
do-liberal legacy. It implied that the continuous governance of monetary policy by the rule of 
law and the commitment to prize stability were a sine qua non for Germany’s participation in 
monetary union. This, of all things, was not deemed worthy of mention in the public-law divi-
sion of European law scholarship both in Germany and elsewhere.22  
With its judgment on the Maastricht Treaty and its insistence on Germany’s “democratic 
statehood” on the one hand, its consent to the new treaty on the other, the FCC has build up 
the reputation of a dog “that barks but does not bite.”23 The financial crisis generated various 
opportunities to consolidate that ambiguous reputation. Its judgment of 19 June 2012 dealt 
with a complaint by “The Greens” who alleged that the political rights of the parliament, en-
shrined in Article 23 of the Basic law, to be adequately informed by the government about the 
financial risks of Germany’s commitments in European rescue measures, had not been re-
spected. The FCC defended the position of the Bundestag.24 Its judgment documents very 
precisely how difficult it has become for the parliament to keep track of what is happening in 
Europe’s crisis management In a comment in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Christian 
Geyer described the judgment as the “anatomy of a deception”.25 Unfortunately, however, the 
Court did not substantiate the implications of the government’s failure in a way which would 
ensure an effective parliamentary involvement in European crisis politics. 
 Two further decisions on in involvement of Germany in European rescue measures deserve 
particular mention... The first is the judgment of 7 September 2011 on aid for Greece.26 The 
plaintiffs in this litigation were a group of professorial economists and Dr. Gauweiler, a 
member of the Bundestag, as representing the Bavarian branch of the Christian Democratic 
Party (CSU). They challenged both German and European legal instruments as well as further 
measures which are related to attempts to solve the current financial and sovereign debt crisis 
in the area of the European monetary union.27 Again, the messages of the Court are strong in 
principle, but not so constraining in practice. The principle: budgetary powers are a core re-
sponsibility of the parliament and a central element of democratic self-rule; this is why the 
Bundestag must remain “the place in which autonomous decisions on revenue and expendi-
ture are made, even with regard to international and European commitments”28. This, howev-
er, is the point where the law ends: parliament enjoys wide latitude in the exercise of its re-
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sponsibilities – and this is a political prerogative which the Court will respect; it will hence 
not examine the quality or plausibility of parliamentary decision-making.29 The responses to 
the further two complaints were similarly evasive: The Court confirmed its infamous Maas-
tricht dictum that European legal instruments which disregard the competence provisions of 
the treaties (“ausbrechende Rechtsakte”) do not apply in Germany; but that risk, the Court 
continued, was contained by the fact that the economic and monetary union had, after all, 
been formulated to be consistent with the Basic Law. Last but not least: While in principle it 
is true that the government cannot elude its legal obligations with the help of international 
institutions, it remained unclear, whether or not legal protection has to be granted when Euro-
pean law is circumvented or transformed where the integration program of the Union is 
“complemented” by an intergovernmental treaty.30  
The by far most spectacular litigation so far concerned  
the “European Stability Mechanism” (ESM Treaty) and the “Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance on the Economic and Monetary Union” (Fiscal Compact).31 Not only the 
well-known professorial plaintiffs and Dr. Gauweiler but also the parliamentary group of Die 
Linke and no less than 37,000 citizens, among them very prominent figures, had filed com-
plaint requested primarily a temporary injunction, which would inhibit the entering into force 
of the statutes passed by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat on 29 June 2012 as measures to 
deal with the sovereign debt until the final decision of the FCC would be handed down. The 
anxieties of the many publics in the EU and elsewhere awaiting that judgment are easy to ex-
plain. Even though hardly anybody had any doubts about the outcome, it matters how the 
highest judicial authority of the economically most powerful Member State of the Union 
would evaluate Germany’s crisis activities whose government underlines again and again how 
seriously it takes every judicial pronouncement. The outcome was as expected. The plaintiffs 
were disappointed, the government, “Brussels” and “the markets” were relieved. The reso-
nance in academic quarters was unusually positive. On closer inspection, however, the judg-
ment seems highly problematical. Its ambivalence stems, seemingly paradoxically, from the 
Court’s renewed defence of the budgetary power of the German Bundestag as a democratic 
essential. Indeed para. 274 of the judgment reads: “By virtue of its approval of stability aids, 
the Bundestag exercises the influence demanded by the Constitution and is a participant in 
decisions on the amount, conditionality and length of stability aids. It therefore determines the 
most important conditions for future successful demands for capital disbursements under Ar-
ticle 9(2) ESM Treaty”.32 All this, the Court ensures us, will protect the democratic rights of 
German citizens. Non-German citizens of the Union, however, should not be amused at all. 
Why is budgetary autonomy not understood as a common European constitutional legacy, 
respect for which is demanded by Article 4(2) TEU? The one-sidedness of this argument is 
not the only democratic failure of this judgement. With its disregard of “foreign” constitution-
al rights the Court gave implicitly its blessing to the “strict conditionality” of financial aids. 
The conditionality, which the European Central Bank, too, would like to see guaranteed, is 
anything but democratic. How is the approval of conditionality reconcilable with a previous 
passage of the judgment in which the Court argues that the so-called eternity clause of the 
Basic Law(Art. 79 Para. 3) is to guarantee “structures and procedures which keep the demo-
cratic process open“? This makes only sense, if the Court feels committed to Germany and no 
one else.33 And precisely that self-understanding seems to bethe crux of the matter. The FCC 
cannot and must not presume the authority to act as the guardian of European constitutional-
ism in its entirety. Weiler’s respectful ridicule about Court for acting like a dog that barks, but 
does not bite, or Perry Anderson’s caustic remark that the Court underlines democratic princi-
ples with one hand while signing off on their contemptuous treatment with the other sound 
elegant, but are still somewhat simplistic: 34 The actual problem is of a fundamental nature: In 
Europe’s present constellation may have no guardian. The only remaining candidate for that is 
the CJEU. 
The CJEU came into the position to act as the guardian of European constitutionalism 
thanks to the complaints of Thomas Pringle, Member of the Irish Parliament against the in-
volvement of his government in the establishment of the ESM – and the readiness of the Irish 
Supreme Court to do hat the FCC has so far anxiously avoided, namely to submit a reference 
for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU.Pringle had commenced this litigation in April 2013; the 
CJEU (sitting as Full Court, with all 27 judges) handed down its judgment on 27 December 
2012.35 
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Pringle had argued in his complaint that the ESM-Regime constituted an usurpation of 
competences which were not conferred to the Uion. This argument concerned hence the sub-
stitution of EMU as established by the Maastricht Treaty. The substantive and methodological 
core problem which the Court had to resolve stems from the bailout prohibition of Article 125 
TFEU,36 and the emergency exception in Article 122 (2) TFEU.37 The Court restates the con-
ceptual background of the former provlsion succinnctly: “The prohibition laid down in Article 
125 TFEU ensures that the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market when 
they enter into debt, since that ought to prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline. Com-
pliance with such discipline contributes, at Union level, to the attainment of a higher objec-
tive, namely, maintaining the financial stability of the monetary union.”38 How can that phi-
losophy be reconciled with the collective rescue messages which the ESM-Treaty legalises? 
The answer of the Court is straight forward: “Since Article 122(1) TFEU does not constitute 
an appropriate legal basis for any financial assistance from the Union to Member States who 
[sic] are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems, the establishment of a 
stability mechanism such as the ESM does not encroach on the powers which that provision 
confers on the Council.”39  
The answer approves the transformation of the European Economic Constitution by a new 
regime. It goes without aying that this new regime must develop a logic of its own: “[T]he 
ESM Treaty does not provide that stability support will be granted as soon as a Member State 
whose currency is the euro is experiencing difficulties in obtaining financing on the market. 
… [S]upport may be granted to ESM Members … only when such support is indispensable to 
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States and the 
grant of that support is subject to strict conditionality appropriate to the financial assistance 
instrument chosen.”40 
When these interpretation are read together, the full picture of the new constitutional con-
stellation becomes clearly visible: The non-bailout philosophy with its appeal to autonomy 
and responsibility of Member States is being replaced by a regime of collective governance. 
Nowhere in the Pringle judgment does one find an explanation as to the conceptual basis or a 
means-ends rationality of the new modes of European governance. The law delegates such 
matters to politics without caring about the democratic legitimacy of political decision-
making. The CJEU and the FCC are operating in tandem. 
In all this, it becomes apparent that the judiciary has given its blessing to a European crisis 
policy and a monitoring of unparalleled intensity. All this is not the result of sinister conspira-
cies, but takes place because the dynamics of the crisis demand too much of the law and be-
cause compliance with the law as it stand would have aggravated the damage. Not less than 
three former judges of the FCC expressed their dismay publicly. “Does necessity abide by no 
laws?”, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde asked as early as 21 June 2010.41 “Is there no time for 
the law?”, Winfried Hassemer added in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in its 28 June 
2012 issue; Paul Kirchhof discerned a “constitutional emergency” in the Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung of 12 July 2012. – Are we experiencing how Europe and its (former) constitu-
tion are being put on trial? More dramatically, and in the form of an alternative: Is this a state 
of emergency when the “hour of the executive” eventually even time for a “commissarial dic-
tatorship” has come? Or should we instead understand the crisis as an opportunity for Europe 
to push forward its democratisation decisively? Carl Schmitt stands for the first alternative, 
Jürgen Habermas for the second. 
VI. Carl Schmitt’s shadow  
Carl Schmitt considered himself a situational thinker. For this reason, it would not be legiti-
mate to read a diagnosis of Europe’s current situation into his writings. But his opus certainly 
does include a set of theorems that are astonishingly current. This applies not only to the state 
of emergency already mentioned above, but also to his notions from the early 1920s about a 
commissarial dictatorship linked to such a state of emergency and to his analyses from the 
mid-1930s of the decline of the separation of powers. In addition, it also applies to important 
elements of his theory of the Großraum, which he presented in a talk entitled “Völkerrecht-
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liche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte” (The Großraum 
Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign Powers: A Con-
tribution to the Concept of Reich in International Law) at a conference celebrating the 25 an-
niversary of the Kiel Institute and hosting at that occasion the Reichsgruppe Hochschullehrer 
des Nationalsozialistischen Rechtswahrer-Bundes [Reich section of professors in the National 
Socialist Association of Lawyers] in Kiel in the spring of 1939.42  
 The jus publicum europaeum, which had made the sovereign state its central concept, 
Schmitt explained in his key note, was no longer syntonic to the de facto “spatial” order of 
Europe.43 Now, a concrete “space” hadbecome the conceptual basis for international law and 
“the new ordering concept – was from now on that of the “Reich, with its volk based, völkisch 
Großraum order”. Schmitt went on to identify “a people that has proved itself capable of this 
task”, the German volk as a matter of course. That volk was to be the “guarantor and guardi-
an” of the order of the Großraum.44  
The theory of the Großraum with its “German Monroe Doctrine” which “excludes the pos-
sibility of intervention on the part of spatially foreign powers”45 while proclaiming German 
leadership suited Nazi policy. The lecture was Schmitt’s way of reasserting himself as a lead-
ing legal thinker of the Reich.46 Yet Schmitt had based his concept of the Großraum not only 
on völkisch claims to leadership, but also on transformations dominated by technical, industri-
al, and economic developments. Thus, Schmitt outlined, however apocryphally, an erosion of 
the territorial state as the harbinger of the adaptation of international law, the factual re-
structuring of international relations and the replacement of classical international law by 
norm systems which today would affirmatively be called “governance structures’ or, dis-
tanced and critically, authoritarian managerialism.”47 Schmitt underlined two phenomena in 
particular, namely, the economic inter-dependencies beyond state frontiers 
(Großraumwirtschaft) and the specific dynamics and the ruling functions of technology-
driven developments (‘technicity’ [Technizität]).48 
After Europe’s financial crisis and when discussing its crisis management, we must take not 
only Schmitt’s diagnosis on nation-states’ loss of sovereignty and the de-legalization of their 
relationships seriously. Just as relevant are his observations—broadly supported by compara-
tive legal research—on the increase in the powers of the executive and the usurping of legisla-
tive powers by governments forcing through a “ratio gubernativa” with a “laws decreed and 
enforced by the government”.49 Schmitt explicitly linked up with the figure of the “open state 
of emergency” in which “the practice of authorizations to make laws (legislative delegations) 
[is] of particular theoretical and practical relevance”.50 Is such a practice “dictatorial”? 
Schmitt believed that this question is posed too simply. Legislative authority, “provided it is 
constitutional”, “always” offered a "legal bridge, but it can both lead back to the earlier con-
stitutional legality and away from it to an entirely new constitutional basis”.51 
Is this, then, the European constellation after the financial crisis? Former constitutional 
judge Böckenförde, a renowned connaisseur of Schmitt’s oeuvre was the first to allude to the 
“state of emergency.”52 Others followed suit. “The European Stability Mechanism,” writes 
Ulrich Hufeld, has “the format of a constitution-breaching measure along the lines of Carl 
Schmitt’s conceptualization of contrasts,”53 adding a quotation from Schmitt’s 1928 Constitu-
tional Theory: 
 
Such breakout entities are, by nature, measures, not norms. [...] Their necessity arises 
from the particular circumstances of an individual case, an unexpected abnormal situa-
tion. If, in the interest of the whole, such renegade entities are formed, the superiority of 
the existential over mere normativity is apparent. Whoever authorized such acts and is 
capable of acting, is sovereign.54 
 
The “state of emergency” is hardly too speculative a term to characterize the present situa-
tion. “Commissarial dictatorship” however seems too far-fetched an analogy. The new modes 
of economic governance which Europe has established have many masters. The European 
Council sets the tone but is anything but a unitary actor. And the Council must coordinate its 
activities with the Commission; sometimes see the blessing of the European Parliament, na-
tional parliaments, and constitutional courts. Germany clearly the economically strongest Eu-
ropean states is by no means really prepared and in a position exercise hegemonic leadership, 
as some see it or recommend it.55 They must not only come to an arrangement at supranation-
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al level, but also between the levels of the multilevel governance system, as well as interna-
tionally – the dictator has been replaced by technicity.  
How comforting, however are these observations? In a comment on Hans Peter Ipsen’s 
monumental 1972 work Gemeinschaftsrecht, which constituted Germany’s European law 
scholarship as a new legal discipline, Schmitt revealed his opinion of the “constitutional legal-
ity” of European law. He had been “beset by a deep sense of sorrow” when reading the 1000-
page tome. This type of law, which legalizes a technocratic-functional administration of Eu-
ropean associations, had no concept of a legitimate political project.56 Concerning monetary 
union, we could add that its legal constitution with the restriction of the European mandate to 
monetary policy and the concomitant constraints of national powers was one cause of the pre-
sent crisis and its replacement by a transnational crisis management machinery seems very 
much in line with Schmitt’s perceptions – with one important difference: the kind of political 
legitimacy which Schmitt found lacking is not identical with the failures which we have iden-
tified. The practice of European crisis policy, which is seeking refuge in a technocratic exper-
tise and political bargaining, disregards Europe’s commitments to democracy and the rule of 
law. If the old European constitutionalism has proved to be unsustainable, how could new 
constitutional look like and how could it be accomplished? These are the questions Jürgen 
Habermas seeks to answer. 
VII. The crisis as opportunity: Jürgen Habermas 
Between Facts and Norms, Habermas’s opus magnum on the “discourse theory of law and 
democracy”, was published the same year that the Treaty of Maastricht, which limited the EU 
Member States’ political autonomy to such a large extent, was concluded. The threat to his 
project was by no means lost on Habermas. Included in the volume is a piece analyzing the 
tension at play in the relationship between social democracy as institutionalized in the nation-
state on the one hand and the decision-making processes organized at the European level on 
the other, a configuration which in Habermas view already then threatens the political auton-
omy of Europe’s citizens.57 Habermas responds to this threat by firmly taking sides, even in 
this first essay on Europe’s constitution: Europe’s integration, he writes, is a response to the 
failures of the nation-states, above all Germany. Integration not only derives its dignity from 
this legacy, but is at the same time a prerequisite for preserving the accomplishments of dem-
ocratic constitutionalism and must be shaped accordingly.58 Since then, Habermas has re-
tained this stance and intensely followed and supported the process of integration with grow-
ing passion as both a political citizen and a political philosopher. He has defended and elabo-
rated his passionate commitment for a deepening of the integration project despite setbacks 
such as the French, the Dutch and later the Irish referenda, and the downgrading of the ambi-
tions of the European Convention in the Lisbon Treaty.  
 The financial crisis has interventions provoked countless and ever more passionate interven-
tions which were published across Europe in English, French, German and Italian.59 They 
contrast markedly in substance and tone with the prevailing discourses of Europe’s political 
elites and their focus on the evaluation of Europe’s economy by “the markets”: ““Democracy 
is at stake”, he has warned time and time again,”60 Europe is establishing a post-democratic 
regime of “executive federalism”.61 These drastic messages are accompanied by signals of 
hope and also political appeals: he wants us to understand the crisis as a chance, an opportuni-
ty to strengthen the European project. The “strength” which he is advocating is not merely 
Europe’s managerial potential; to him, “more Europe” also means a deepening of Europe’s 
democratic credentials.  
In step with these interventions as a political citizen, Habermas has renewed his theoretical 
agenda, most systematically in his 2011 essay The Crisis of the European Union: A Response. 
The constructive core of his constitutional vision is the idea of dual commitment of Europeans 
as citizens of their states and as citizens of the Union. Fully in line with his discourse theory 
of law and democracy Habermas defends the nation state as the harbinger of human rights and 
democracy. There is no need for Europe to transform into a fully-fledged federation. What 
Europeans have to understand and to live is their dual role: This is a democratic vision be-
cause it breaks with Europe’s praxis of “integration by stealth” and anchors the democratiza-
tion of Europe instead in the minds and activities of its citizens. It is a very Habermasian vi-
sion in that it downplays their political complacency and also the ever growing socio-
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economic diversity of Europe including the conflict constellations which this diversity is 
bound to generate. To put this slightly differently: Habermas does not gloss over the differ-
ences of interests and political preferences of citizens of the individual states; he acknowledg-
es that these will often conflict with those of the citizens of the Union.62 But he believes that 
the citizens of Europe will increasingly become aware of their dual status, and that this trans-
formation of their mindsets could generate solidarity and an identity spanning the national 
citizenries. Nor does Habermas overlook that Europe’s political elites pursue the particularis-
tic-egoistic orientations of their electors tactically. Yet he assumes that the crisis will force 
them to “rally the population behind a common European future”.63 
The present discussion about the European democratic deficit has its precursors. It has been 
conducted with ever greater intensity since the Maastricht Treaty twenty years ago precisely 
because of the promised move towards am “ever closer Union” A legendary dispute between 
Dieter Grimm and Jürgen Habermas in 1995 was one of its early moments of glory.64 Dieter 
Grimm had put forward the following and warned: The body of European treaties was neither 
an expression of self-determination on the part of a European society nor should or could it 
organize a pan-European constitution. Too many of the cultural, social and political prerequi-
sites on which democratic polities depended were lacking. This diagnosis, Habermas coun-
tered, was correct, but it failed to respond to the erosion of the nation-states’ capacity to act 
and underestimated the democratic potential of the process of Europeanisation. What mattered 
was to “initiate in terms of constitutional law” the communicative relationships that Grimm 
found lacking and that indeed had been realized only rudimentarily. 
The continuity of both adversaries’ lines of argument is remarkable – and just as remarkable 
is a common lacuna: in both contributions, the economy driving Europe in its state of crisis is 
non-existent. Yet at the time, the legal constitution of monetary union was considered the core 
of the Maastricht Treaty, a jewel in the crown of the single market, which would lead to polit-
ical union. The unfounded audacity of these notions can easily be reconstructed within the 
framework of Polanyi’s economic sociology discussed at the outset.  
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VIII. Unitas in pluralitate: An alternative vision for the European Union  
Normatively speaking, deciding between authoritarian “post-democratic executive 
federalism” and a Union furnished with new competencies and democratically legitimated is 
unproblematic. The question is only whether that alternative is on the agenda. The challenges 
which Europe faces and European scholars and politicians must address are twofold. We have 
to understand the design failure of the European institutional architecture and on that basis 
reconsider Europe’s future. With the law-politics relationship this essay has focused on one 
characteristic of the integration project which ensured or contributed to its very remarkably 
successful beginning in the formative phase. The law provided a civilizing link among former 
enemies. The constitutionalisation of European law with its empowerment of the judicial 
branch fostered economic integration and defined by the same token a politically restricted 
finalité below federal ambitions. These limitations turned, ironically and tragically, into 
failures with the dynamics of the integration process and its deepening. Our analyses of this 
seemingly progressive but in hindsight destructive moves have focused on monetary union 
(the “economic constitution”) and on industrial relations (the “social constitution”). In both 
fields Europe’s once so successful toolbox proved to be deficient. In both fields the law was 
(ab)used as an ersatz of politics. Referring to Polanyi’s economic sociology we have argued 
that these experiences should not simply be attributed to the neo-liberal tilt of the European 
institutional architecture but to the sociological and political dimensions of economic 
processes. That diagnosis is by now hardly controversial in principle. The same is true cum 
grano salis for two of its implications: Europe must acknowledge the failure of it “one-size-
fits-all” philosophy which it has pursued in its reliance on law as the “agent and the object of 
integration.”65 It must acknowledge that the financial crisis and the inability to institutionalize 
a European social model signal political failure which cannot be cured within the present 
institutional configuration. 
 But do not Habermas with his plea for a Political Union and Europe’s political elites with 
their quest for “more Europe” respond to precisely that impasse? The problematic of these 
responses should have become sufficiently apparent. The praxis of Europe’s crisis 
management has so far not delivered the promised output and is about to deepen Europe’s 
democratic deficit and to destruct its legitimacy while Habermas cannot plausibly explain 
how a democratic turn of these developments might come about. 
The alternative to which the Latin notion in the title of this section points was the motto of 
the ill-fated 2003 Constitutional Treaty about Europe being “united in diversity.”66 To recall 
this formula is by no means to advocate some regressive return to the nation state. It is instead 
meant to reorient European studies sociologically and normatively. The socio-economic, so-
ciological and political development of the EU is characterized, the common currency of 17 
member states notwithstanding, by ever more diversity even among the 17 eurozone coun-
tries. This development has surprised the advocates of the “ever closer Union” proclaimed by 
the Maastricht Treaty. Its acceleration, however, is anything but surprising in particular after 
the Eastern enlargement of the Union. Due to this increasing diversity the interests and con-
flict configurations in the Union are ever more diverging. This is neither good nor bad in itself 
but it necessitates a move from “integration through uniformization” to integration through 
conflict resolution.” “Conflicts-law as Europe’s constitutional form” is the notion which I 
have coined for such a constitutional change. The approach was designed as a counter-move 
to the orthodoxy of European legal doctrines and an alternative to the mainstream of Europe-
an constitutionalism, on the one hand, and a defense of the integration project against both the 
gradual destruction of Europe’s welfarist legacy and its clandestine de-legalization, on the 
other – with the constructive ambition to defend the European commitments to democratic 
governance and the rule of law. I am not going to summarize here what I have repeated ad 
nauseam over a decade.67 What I will do instead is to sketch out how this kind of approach 
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may inspire a novel way of dealing with the financial crisis as it has manifested itself in the 
transformation of the economic constitution (1) and the turn to an austerity union.(2). 
(1) We can, sadly, assume that the experts and technocrats in the Directorate General 
“Economy and Finance” in the European Commission and the European technocratic 
networks will not deliver what their political masters are promising. Such failures will 
provoke increasingly the political public, national parliaments and even faction in the EP. 
Will it become ever more apparent that it is simply impossible for the great majority of 
signatories of the “Fiscal Compact” that they will not be able to comply with the requirements 
imposed upon them. 
 If these conjectures are warranted, the room for political manoeuvre will widen. And yet, so 
far some substantial transformation of the regime which has been established is out of sight 
and it is hard to believe that conceptual disorientation and frustration with the implementation 
of the new European economic governance will somehow generate re-orientation among the 
epistemic community organising of Europe’s crisis management. But conflicts of interests 
cannot be camouflaged and the European technocracy cannot be shielded against the 
European public and politicians who are accountable to their constituencies. Is it conceivable 
that the new policy coordination within the annually repeating European Semester, the 
reporting and multilateral surveillance obligations, the macroeconomic imbalance procedures, 
the responses to country-specific recommendations lead to new assessments of the weight of 
socio-economic diversity, insights into the social embeddedness of markets, 
acknowledgement of the different regulatory, social and economic cultures in the Member 
States, a search for innovative responses to complex conflict constellations – and sooner or 
later even to the developments of standards and criteria which discipline authoritarian 
managerialism? 
(2) It is true that the process of integration by no means simply deregulated Europe’s 
economy. But it did destroy the interdependence between (nation-state) labor relations and the 
European economic constitution without reconstituting the European welfare-state traditions 
at European level. It undermined the manifold ways in which the economy was socially 
embedded in the Member States and institutionalized monetary union in a set of rules that had 
to operate in a social vacuum. Social disintegration, Polanyi claimed, would lead to crises and 
then trigger countermovements. The executive-governmental federalism with which Europe 
responds to its crises has nothing in common with the countermovements Polanyi imagined. 
They are rather to be found in the protests against the policies for dealing with the crisis. We 
are witnessing ever more unrest and protest among disempowered citizens who are exposed to 
austerity measures which are experienced as hopeless, if not unnecessary suffering. 
 These responses to the European turn to “competitiveness” as a new pan-European value 
have so far not led to an organised transnational movement with an elaborated agenda. This, 
however, may well happen in not too far a future. What we can observe day by day, however, 
are conflicts between the European commitments to the rule of law and democracy and the 
practices of its crisis management. It should be a matter of time until these conflicts are 
framed as legal claims and reach the law in Europe. So far, this did hardly happen. A -- 
modest -- signal has been sent by Portugal’s constitutional court.68 That Court has examined 
the compatibility of the austerity measures of the Portuguese government with the Portuguese 
constitution. The Court did explicitly recognize “the seriousness of the current 
economic/financial situation and the need to attain the public-deficit goals included in the 
specific economic policy conditions laid down in the memoranda of understanding between 
the Portuguese government, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund.” But it 
did then object to the implementation of these requests because of their disregard of the 
principles of equality and proportionality. This is not much, but it is more than nothing.  
The management of the crisis by means of regulatory policy and the call for a democratic 
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deepening of Europe have something in common that is apparently considered to be without 
alternative: the way out of the crisis is said to require “more Europe”. To what extent is such a 
way out in fact without alternative? Anyone who takes the trouble to study the crisis man-
agement procedures and the numerous recommendations made and rubber-stamped in the 
context of the European Semester will wonder:69 Is this the way to do justice to the fact that 
the socioeconomic differences in the expanded Union are precisely not smoothing out, at least 
not uniformly, but are deepening? Is this the way to correct the disintegrative effects of the 
neoliberal interventions in the Union’s capitalisms? If it is not possible to construct a uniform 
welfare-state model, is it then advisable to dismantle Europe’s welfare-state traditions alto-
gether? If our goal is not to suppress Europeans’ painful memories, not to iron out the differ-
ences between their historical experiences, not to waste the wealth of their cultures, must not 
then tolerance determine the status of European citizens?  
These questions are rhetorical. They are directed towards the currently practiced centralist 
style of European governance, which must claim to have knowledge that does not exist. To 
take up once more what was said at the outset, they are directed against the notion that one 
could suspend or write off democracy entirely by enthusiastically disbursing money and im-
posing strict cutbacks. They find normative support in the felicitous “motto” of the ill-fated 
2003 Constitutional Treaty about Europe being “united in diversity”. They do not project a 
return to the nation-state, least of all to that of Max Weber, but aim for legally structured rela-
tionships of cooperation in a Europe that has to learn to deal in a civil way with the conflicts 
resulting from its diversity, but which may refrain from attempting to attain the status of a 
major power.70  
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